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PAST AND POSSIBLE FUTURE OF THE COLLECTIVE AMPARO
PROCESS (AMPARO COLECTIVO)
DR. LUCIO CABRERA ACEVEDO'
I. INTRODUCTION
The term amparo colectivo [collective amparo] suggests a procedure for judicial
review of class action suits under Mexican law. This proposed judicial review
procedure would have two main purposes. The first purpose would achieve a
practical end by avoiding numerous claims with the same purpose, similar to
consumers' rights cases. The second purpose would produce a legal end by
protecting the "new" human rights laws and regulations developed in the 1960's.
These rights include a healthy environment-landscape and urban images-the
equality of women, ethnic equality, and other rights comparable to civil rights laws
in the United States. Currently, the amparo process does not protect these "new"
human rights.
Unlike the amparo process, other foreign jurisdictions allow claims asserting
violations of rights by giving parties standing. The concept of "le recours collectif'
[class action suits] as defined by the Civil Code of Procedure of Quebec', is as
follows:
d)"Class action" means the procedure that enables one member to sue without
a mandate on behalf of all the members.
c)"Member" means a natural person whom is part of a group on behalf of which

a natural person brings or intends to bring a class action.
Therefore, in class action suits a "member" could be given standing for an entire
group. The definition in Quebec's Civil Code of Procedure seems to include NonGovernment Organizations (NGO's) as a "member" of a group. This appears to give
NGO's standing as a plaintiff without a mandate.
This kind of procedural remedy does not exist in Mexico. Therefore, this article
suggests that the amparo process in Mexico adopt the concept of class action suits.
This procedure could provide a preventive remedy against environmental damages
and violations of human rights. The adoption of class action suits through the
collective amparo system could be similar to injunctive class actions, as defined in
the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.2 However, the collection of damages
would not be determined by this new amparo proceeding.

* Dr. Cabrera Acevedo is presently the head of the Historical Commission of the Supreme Court of Mexico.
He has been a professor of law and histo y at several universities in Mexico, a visiting professor (Fulbright Scholar)
at Central College in Iowa, and a lecturer at Land University, Sweden and at Sao Paolo University, Brazil. Dr.
Cabrera Acevedo received his Doctor of Law and History from the Universidad Nacional Aut6noma de Mexico.
1. CoDE OF CIVIL PRoCEDuRE [hereinafter CODE OF CIV. P.], Book IX, Title l, Art. 999-1002. (Can.)
2. FED. R. Cr. P. 23(b).
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11. NAFTA CHALLENGES THE NATURE OF MEXICAN INJUNCTION AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW
The adoption and implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) challenges Mexico's injunction and judicial review procedures. These
challenges are most obvious when environmental issues must be addressed.
Presently, one of the most important legal fields is the enforcement of environmental
law. In North America and Canada, federal, state, and provincial rules and statutes
govern environmental law. These rules and statutes enforce decisions made by both
administrative agencies and judicial courts. 4 In Mexico, environmental law is
governed by rules and statutes established solely by administrative agencies.
Mexican courts cannot protect the environment because individuals and NGO's lack
standing in the judicial review process, Therefore, judicial decisions are simply not
possible.
In any case, judicial intervention may not be a complete solution to protecting the
environment because limitations always exist. However, judicial decisions could
complement the decisions made by administrative agencies. Achieving this
cooperative relationship would require awarding standing to individuals and NGO's.
By awarding standing, Mexican courts would be in accordance with NAFTA. The
Rio Declaration, approved by Canada, the United States, and Mexico, expressed in
its first principle that "human beings are the center of everything related to
sustainable development. They have the right to a healthy and productive life in
harmony with nature." 5 This principle is also incorporated into the text of NAFTA.6
For these reasons, it seems necessary that Mexico should permit individuals and
NGO'S access to procedural remedies by adopting a collective amparo process.
Mexico's enforcement of environmental law would improve.
A. Comparative law
The collective amparo would be procedurally similar to processes commonly
practiced in the United States, Canada, Western Europe, and Brazil. Although each
country has its own particular proceedings, generally, in class action suits one
claimant has standing to represent several other claimants without a mandate.
For example, in Sweden the '"jamnsstalleombudsmanen"[ombudsman] protects
the equality of women in their jobs. In the State of Bremen, Federal Republic of
Germany, the courts have allowed NGO's to protect the environment since 1979.
Portugal and Italy permit NGO's to initiate proceedings before the courts to protect

3. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17,1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex. (effective Jan. 1, 1994), 32 I.LM.
605 (1993).
4. The Supreme Court of California held that "It is an affirmation of the duty of the state to protect the
people's common heritage of streams, lakes, marshlands, and tidelands, surrendering that right of protection only
in rare cases when the abandonment of that right is consistent with the purpose of the trust." Nat 7 Audubon Society
v. The Superior Court ofAlpine County. 658 P.2d 709, 731 (Cal.1983).
5. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development [heremnafter Rio Declaration], at princ. 1, U.N. (1992).
6. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation [hereinafter N.A.F.T.A.], Sept, 13, 1993,
U.S.-Can.-Mex., preamble, 1993 WL 792463 (N.A.F.T.A.).
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their artistic and cultural heritage.' Spain allows one member of a group to represent
all of its members in the protection of their rights before the Constitutional Court.8
The United States provides for both injunctive and damage class actions in Rule
23 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.9 This process permits legal actions
protecting several rights such as ethnic equality in education, the environment and
biodiversity. Similarly, Canada implemented this process when the province of
Quebec adopted class actions in chapter IX of its Code of Civil Procedure.'
Moreover, in 1985 Brazil passed a law, illustrated in the Code of the Consumer of
1991, allowing collective proceedings protecting the environment and consumers."
These governments use their codes for both injunctive relief and for the
determination of damages.
As far as class action suits are concerned, there are primarily three types of
countries, according to Mauro Cappelletti (Italian) and Bryant Garth (American) who
studied the subject of collective actions in the Congress of Civil Procedure of
Wtirsburg, Germany, (September 11-16, 1993).12 First, there are countries without
procedures for collective actions. Second, there are countries with only injunctive
relief. Finally, there are countries adopting the U.S. model, which allow both
injunctive and damage class actions. Mexico's system is in the first category,
therefore, there are no collective actions in Mexico. Mexico's adoption of collective
amparo would introduce injunctive class action suits to Mexican judicial courts.
I1. TWO MAIN FACTORS SUPPORTING THE CREATION OF
COLLECTIVE AMPARO
The adoption and implementation of collective amparo in the Mexican judicial
system is supported by two main factors-the international factor and the democratic
factor. The international factor would permit Mexico to comply with its duties stated
in the principles of the Rio Declaration 3 and NAFTA. t4 For example, according to
the NAFTA supplemental agreement on environmental protection, "each Party shall
ensure that judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative enforcement proceedings are
available under its law to sanction or remedy violations of its environmental laws and
regulations."" Furthermore, the agreement provides that:
Private access to remedies shall include rights, in accordance with the Party's
law, such as...

7.

Mauro Cappelletti, Vindicating the Public Interest through the Courts: A Comparativist "sContribution,

Emerging Issues and Perspectives at553 (1979).
Access to Justice, Vol. II,
8. Tribunal Constitucional de Espafla [Constitutional Tribunal of Spain] 1994. A case where a few people
were allowed to represent theSpanish Jewish community.
9. FED. R. Civ. P., supra note 3.

supra note 1, atar.999-1002, sec. d.
10. CODE OFCIV. P.,
11. Brazil has legislation protecting the environment through its judicial process in a 1985 law.
12. Mauro Cappelletti and Bryant Garth, The Protection of Diffuse, Fragmented, and Collective Interests in
Civil Litigation, at 135.

13. Rio Declaration, supra note 6, at princs. 10, 13.
14. N.A.F.T.A., supra note 7,at preamble.
15. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept, 13, 1993, U.S.-Can.-Mex., pt. two, art.
5-1-j, 5-2, 6-3-1, 7-1-4, 1993 WL 792465 (N.A.F.T.A.).
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(c) to request the competent authorities to take appropriate action to enforce that
Party's environmental laws and regulations in order to protect the environment
or to avoid environmental harm; or
(d) to seek injunctions where a person suffers, or may suffer, loss, damage or
injury as a result of conducts by another person under that
Party's jurisdiction contrary
to that Party's environmental laws and regulations
16
from torturous conduct.
Additionally, "each Party shall ensure that tribunals that conduct or review such
proceedings are impartial and ' independent
and do not have any substantial interest
7
in the outcome of the matter.'
The NAFTA agreement on environmental protection requires that victims of
environmental hazards should have access to independent courts, such as the Federal
Courts of Mexico, the Circuit Court or the Mexican Supreme Court. These courts
already utilize the amparo process as a method to challenge administrative actions.
The collective amparo process could be implemented and enforced through these
courts. Furthermore, collective amparo would be an aspect of the amparo against
administrative action.
The collective amparo process would implement the Rio Declaration, which states
that "the best way to deal with environmental problems is with the participation of
all the citizens .... At the national level persons shall have proper access to the same
information about the environment as the authorities have."' 8 It is the position of this
article that Mexico is obligated to give standing to individuals and NGO's to enforce
environmental laws through judicial proceedings. The collective amparo would
implement this process in conjunction with Mexican legal traditions. Moreover, it
would be necessary to create another process for the collection of damages as
illustrated by the United States in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The democratic factor's necessity became apparent in May of 1994 when
Professor Gilbert R. Winham of New Scotland, Canada, noted during NAFTA
discussions at the Colegio de Mexico, that Canadians and Americans realized
administrative law in Mexico was extremely hermetic and secret.' 9 Therefore, it
seemed that judicial review was not available, nor did an international arbitrage panel
system seem to be possible. Since the enforcement of environmental laws and
regulations has been a discretionary power of the executive in Mexico, individuals
have not been allowed to participate in or gather information on this enforcement.
To remedy this situation, the collective amparo could be used to open the
accessibility of the administrative law system of Mexico. Mexico's administrative
law system would then be similar to democratic countries, which generally emphasize
an open and public administration.
Through the collective amparo Mexico would necessarily open its administrative
system. Mexican citizens should participate in the enforcement of environmental
laws and regulations. Also the collective amparo would further protect human and

16. Id. atarts. 6-1, 6-3.
17. Id. atart. 7-4.
18. Rio Declaration, supra note 6, at princ. 10.
19. Gilbert R. Winham, What Mexico can expect from NAFTA Chapter 19: "Review and Dispute Settlement
in Antidumping and CountervailingDuty Matters,
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social rights that have not received attention until very recently. This process would
encourage a more democratic government in Mexico.
IV. THE LIMITATIONS OF MEXICAN INJUNCTION AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW IN AMPARO PROCEEDINGS
The young Mexican, Mariano Otero, who read Tocqueville's famous book
"Democracy in America", created the amparo process at the federal level in Mexico
in 1847.20 Otero advised that amparo proceedings should protect individuals by
limiting court decisions to a case by case basis without overall general effects.
In 1857, the Mexican Constitution stated in article 101 that standing in amparo is
given to an individual claiming infringement of their human rights. 21 Therefore,
standing was only given to individuals directly affected by injuries of law, not by
injuries of fact. At that time corporations, as artificial persons, would not have
standing because they would not be entitled to human rights.
Eventually, corporations were considered to have standing to proceed in amparo
if a corporation's by-laws stated that a manager with power of attorney could
properly represent the corporation. The corporation also needed to demonstrate that
they had suffered an injury of law, such as a breach of contract or loss of property.
Ten years after the fall of the Maximilian Empire, when Benito Judrez (1867-72)
and Sebastian Lerdo (1872-1876) were respectively presidents of Mexico, the amparo
process extended standing to disorganized groups of Indians. One or two individuals
without power of attorney would represent the whole of the Indian group. For
example, the Supreme Court of Mexico granted amparo to several disorganized
22
Indian groups such as the Tenochtitla, Puebla; Coxcatlin, Puebla and many others.
Also during that time, the Supreme Court interpreted the amparo process as granting
standing to individuals without power of attomey. In that case, the court granted
amparo protection in order to stop the destruction of a plaza located in Ciudad
Guzmdn, Jalisco.23 In another case, a vendor represented many other small vendors
doing business in one plaza whereby enjoining the prohibition of their activities on
the street' However, the Supreme Court of Mexico ended this trend when Ignacio
L. Vallarta was Chief Justice (1877-1882). Chief Justice Vallarta insisted that
individuals and corporations seeking standing for amparo protection should be
restricted to cases of injuries in law, not injuries in fact. No person would be
permitted to represent other persons without proper power of attorney.
The Constitution of 1917 did not change the way courts applied amparo privileges.
The restricted procedure initiated by Vallarta continues to govern procedures today.
This procedure has no exceptions for the protection of social rights of rural
communities because individuals are not properly organized with specific by-laws
nor represented by persons with specific powers. Although opinions of the Supreme
20. Mariano Otero was a young lawyer from Jalisco, Mexico that drafted the consitutional Reform Act of
1847.
21. CONSITUCI6N POLtICA DELOS ESTADOS UNIDOSMEUCANOS [Mexican Constitution], art. 101, ch. I, art.
i,§1.
22. "San Bernabd Tenochtitla, Estado de Puebla," 3 pt. 2 SJF. 493 (Ia epoca 1872). "Coxcatlgn, Estado de
Puebla," 3 pt. 2 SJ.F.831 (iaepoca 1873).
23. "Concepci6n Pdrez," 3 pt. 2 S.J.F. 533 (la epoca 1872).
24. "Aredondo. Femando y Huerta, Jose M.," 3 pt. 2 SJ.F. 843 (la epoca 1873).
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Court of Mexico continue to mirror decisions made in the nineteenth century, the
Circuit Courts of Mexico have made a few exceptions in recent years.
V. PRESENT SITUATION AND TRENDS TOWARD THE COLLECTIVE

AMPARO
Generally, Mexican courts do not allow single individuals or NGOs to act on
behalf of other people without a mandate. This idea is expressed in a 1972 amparo
decision by the Mexican Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the "Federal
Judiciary Power is not entitled to oblige an administrative authority to follow the
urbanistic and sanitary rles, nor to deal with aesthetic and practical necessities, when
it is establishing a cemetery." '
This decision must be followed by Circuit Courts and Federal Judges in Mexico.
However, there have been some inconsistent decisions by Circuit Courts. The
decisions are often based on the practical circumstances and necessities of the people
involved. Two decisions are of particular relevance. The first decision of the First
Circuit Court of Administrative Matters of Mexico City states that "members of a
neighborhood are interested in urban regulations of the parks and the esthetic aspects
of them.. . and the government does not have the right to destroy parks and green
areas."26 Another important decision involved an individual claimant, Homero
Aridjis, and an NGO, El Grupo de los Cien Internacional A.C. The plaintiffs
claimed that the Secretary of the Environment, Natural Resources and Fishing of
Mexico issued a decree simplifying the environmental protection standards
applicable to small and medium industries resulting in severe damage to the
environment. For the first time, the claimants based their standing on NAFTA's
supplemental agreement on the environment.27 This Circuit Court decision approved
the application of the NAFTA agreement and granted amparo protection in favor of
the plaintiffs.'
These decisions are of great importance and entirely different from previous
decisions made by the Supreme Court of Mexico because they mention the
enforcement of a NAFTA parallel agreement. The existence of NAFTA helped make
these decisions possible. Therefore, these are important steps supporting the creation
of the collective amparo process. Some amendments to amparo law should be made
in order to regulate with more precision certain points of procedure, as the Code of
Civil Procedure of Quebec does.29
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This article introduces a procedure that would complement the current amparo
process utilized by the Mexican judicial system. The implementation of the
collective amparo process would help guarantee the human rights that each individual
is entitled to by allowing class action suits. These class action suits give both
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

"Guajardo, Alejandro y otros." 37 pt. 2 S.J.F. 29 (7aepoca 1972).
"Asociaci6n de la Colonia Fuentes del Pedregal," 145 pt. 2 S.J.F. 38 (7a epoca 1982).
"Aridjis. Homero yEl Grupo de los Cien Internacional A.C.," 5 SJ.F. 689 (9aepoca 1997).
Id.
CODE OF CIV. P.supra note 1.
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individuals and NGOs the opportunity to file a claim for amparo protection against
human rights violations. Currently, regular arnparo is not granted when human rights
violations are claimed. Mexico's adoption of the collective amparo process would
not only give individuals and NGOs amparo protection, it would also comply with
NAFTA's procedural requirements for human rights violations. The procedure for
filing class action suits is simple. Individuals would submit a claim for amparo
protection independently. A representative for an injured group would be elected as
a sole claimant. However, decisions rendered by the courts would apply to the group
as a whole. Since it is difficult to get amparo protection, class actions would help
secure amparo protection for a group's claim by strengthening the claim's legal
foundation. Essentially, the enforcement of the collective amparo would ensure a
democratic approach to Mexican jurisprudence.

